Buffalo Law Review
Volume 8

Number 1

Article 19

10-1-1958

Civil Procedure—Res Judicata—Judgment for Defendant on Nonappearance of Plaintiff No Bar to Subsequent Action
Buffalo Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Buffalo Law Review, Civil Procedure—Res Judicata—Judgment for Defendant on Non-appearance of
Plaintiff No Bar to Subsequent Action, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 62 (1958).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol8/iss1/19

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

the Court of Appeals does nor say that any incompetent who has not been
judicially declared so may successfully sue while alleging his own incompetence.
The holding merely permits a trial court, in its discretion, to permit such a person
to g- forward with an action, if it appears that under the circumstances of that
particular case the interests of the incompetent would be better protected than by
requiring the appointment of a committee and a judicial declaration of
incompetency.
Res Judicata--Judgment for Defendant on Non-appearance of Plaintiff no Bar
to Subsequent Action
The defendant, in Greenberg v. DeHart, 13 made a motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice. Prior to the
commencement of the present action, the Greenbergs had asserted the same
causes of action against DeHart in an action commenced in King's County. This
action was consolidated with an action to recover damages for injury to property
commenced by DeHart, since both actions arose out of the same automobile
collision. When the consolidated action came up for trial, the Greenbergs did
not appear. At this point in the proceedings, the claim asserted by DeHart had
been settled and there remained to be tried only the issues in the Greenbergs'
personal injury action. The attorney for defendant appeared and waived a jury
trial and the court proceeded to take evidence from defendant's witnesses. At the
close of the evidence, the trial court granted *defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the merits and judgment of that effect was entered. It is this
judgment, purportedly rendered on the merits, that constituted the basis of
defendant's motion to dismiss in the present action. The Court held that the
doctrine of res judicata did not apply and accordingly reinstated the order of the
special term denying the defendant's motion to dismiss in the present action.
A judgment must be rendered upon the merits if it is to be used as an
estoppel to the prosecution of subsequent action. 14 The effectiveness of the
adjudication will depend, not on its form, but on the nature of the proceedings in
which it was made.' 5 After a careful analysis of the proceedings, the Court
concluded that the judgment relied on by DeHart as a bar to the present action
was no more than a noasuit. 16 A recital in the judgment that it is upon the
merits lends no efficacy to it for purposes of res judicata. But the defendant
alleged that the lower court authoritatively rendered a judgment on the merits
pursuant to section 494-a of the Civil Practice Act which provides for the
13. 4 N.Y.2d 511, 176 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1958).
14. Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N.Y. 114, 63 N.E. 823 (1902).
15. Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N.Y. 484, 1 N.E.2d 975 (1936); but 3ee Ziegler v.
International Railway Co., 232 App. Div. 43, 248 N.Y.Supp. 375 (4th Dep't 1931).
16. See Honsinger v. Union Carriage & Gear Co., 175 N.Y. 229, 67 N.E. 436
(1903).
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rendering of a default judgment upon failure of a party to appear or proceed to
trial, Relying on Mink v. Keim, 7 the Court reaffirmed its position that a
judgment under this section may be entered only upon a complaint or counterclaim. The defendant had no action on which to proceed since his property
damage action had been settled and his contention was accordingly rejected.
Separate Trial Where Insurance Company Joined as Party Defendant
In Kelly v. Yannotti,18 appellant, an insurance company, had been impleaded
by the defendant in a negligence action. When a jury trial was demanded,
appellant moved under section 96 of the Civil Practice Act to sever the actions.
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether denial of this motion by the
trial court constituted an abuse of discretion.
The New York courts have long held that in actions where insurance
companies are impleaded a finding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover might
influence the jury in its determination of the separate issue of whether defendant
was covered by the alleged insurance contract, or that conversely, a finding that
defendant is covered by insurance might influence the determination of plaintiff's
right to relief. Thus, motions for severance have been allowed so as not to have
the same jury pass on both issues. 19
In the present case the Court held that denial of the motion to sever
constituted an abuse of discretion since there would be no impairment of a
substantial right of any party and the insurance company probably would be
subject to some prejudice if the main action and the third party action were
tried by the same jury.
Res Judicata and Collaferal Esfoppel-Idenfity of Parties
In Commissioners v. Low, 20 the State Insurance Fund (workmen's compensation insurer for the State of New York) brought the action as statutory assignee
of the representative of a state employee, killed in an accident while on duty in a
state automobile. The suit was brought against the private motorist and owner of
the other car in the accident which resulted in the employee's death. Prior to this
action by the State Insurance Fund, the private motorist had himself sued the
State of New York on the theory that the accident was caused solely by the
17. 291 N.Y 300, 52 N.E.2d 444 (1943).
18. 4 N.Y.2d 603, 176 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 95 N.E. 10 (1911);
Taplin v. Stevens, 280 App. Div. 960, 117 N.Y.S.2d 606 (4th Dep't 1952); Warner v.
Star Co., 162 App. Div. 458, 147 N.Y.Supp. 803 (2d Dep't 1914); Delany v. Allen,
200 Misc. 734, 105 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup.Ct. 1951); Butera v. Donner, 177 Misc. 966,
32 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup.Ct. 1942).
20. 3 N.Y.2d 590, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958).

